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Abstract
our project was to implement a Secure End-to-End
M-Commerce system. We have called it SeMCom.
We have implemented a Client application, a trans-
action server, a virtual wallet on the transaction
server for the client, and a bank server. Semcom
conforms to all of the security requirements.
All of the links in our system have end-to-end se-
curity, and conform to the requirements for data in-
tegrity, Authentication, Non-Repudiation and data
confidentiality.
SeMCom conforms to the Secure Electronic
Transaction standard (SET), but is also a much
simpler implementation than most of the existing
implementations today.
1 Introduction
Mobile commerce or M-commerce can be described
as the act of performing an electronic transaction
that has financial implications from a mobile de-
vice such as a cellular phone or Personal Digital
Assistant (PDA). An example of this would be the
purchase of an item from a shop using a mobile
device to perform the entire transaction.
The term “electronic transaction” means that
the transaction details are electronically transferred
from the user’s mobile device, over one or many
public cellular and/or computer networks, to the
party that is supposed to accept the transaction
(which, in our case, is the merchant’s bank).
Mobile commerce is a relatively new develop-
ment, and for this reason there are no industry-wide
accepted standards for securing it as of yet. The
goals of this project was to design and implement
a secure end-to-end m-commerce system based on
the proposed architecture (see figure 1).
In principal, the only difference between m-
commerce and e-commerce is that the customer is
connected to a wireless link as opposed to one con-
sisting of physical wires or cables such as telephone
lines and network cables. From this perspective,
existing e-commerce systems could be adapted to
suit m-commerce without much effort.
Security is a crucial requirement of an m-
commerce system due to the fact that the sensitive
financial information that these systems transmit
travel over untrusted networks where it is essen-
tially fair game for anyone with local or even re-
mote access to any part of the path followed.
The suggested architecture (see figure 1) is signif-
icantly simpler than existing e-commerce architec-
tures such as SET (Secure Electronic Transaction).
In SET, the financial transactions are performed by
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the merchant, introducing a level of distrust which
adds significant complexity to the system’s secu-
rity. This is illustrated by the sheer size of the
SET specification (971 pages [2]).
The goal of this project was to implement and/or
acquire the necessary software in order to imple-
ment an end-to-end secure m-commerce system on
top of the specified architecture. This goal was
achieved and resulted in a system called Semcom
(Secure End-to-end M-COMmerce) which is much
simpler in design, but which, at the same time, sat-
isfies most of the requirements of SET.
This paper discusses the development of Semcom
and how it manages to satisfy the requirements of
a standard as complex as SET while being built
on top of an architecture which is much simpler in
comparison.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Cryptography
Before discussing cryptography, we present a few
important definitions:
Plaintext: The original, unmodified mesage or
data which is used as input to the encryption
algorithm.
Ciphertext: The scrambled, encrypted message
that is produced by the encryption algorithm.
Encryption algorithm: The algorithm performs
various substitutions and transformations on
the plaintext (input) to produce the ciphertext
(output).
Secret Key Used as input to the algorithm; af-
fects the exact substitutions and transforma-
tions performed by the algorithm on the plain-
text.
Decryption algorithm: Essentially the encryp-
tion algorithm run in reverse in order to trans-
form the ciphertext back into plaintext (de-
cryption).
Cryptography is the process of transforming
the original plaintext message into scrambled, un-
readable ciphertext using an encryption algorithm
whose mathematical operations on the plaintext
are controlled by the encryption key.
An important note is that the security of encryp-
tion depends on the secrecy of the key, not the algo-
rithm. Good encryption algorithms are well known
to the public, allowing them to be carefully anal-
ysed for flaws.
2.2 Conventional/Private Key
Cryptography
Conventional encryption algorithms use the same
key for encryption and decryption. If more than
one party is involved in the operation, this secret
key needs to be known to them all, which may cause
logistical problems if many parties are involved.
The upside of a shared secret key is that the en-
cryption process significantly faster compared to
public-key cryptography. This is due to the fact
that public key encryption algorithms need to per-
form more complex operations in order to function
with two different and complimentary keys.
2.3 Public Key Cryptography
There are several algorithms that make use of this
cryptographic method. In Public key cryptography,
the secret information is not the algorithm used to
encrypt and decrypt the data, but the keys used.
RSA, for example, is a very well-known and estab-
lished public key algorithm that generates keys and
uses them for encryption and decryption.
The algorithms used in public key cryptography
make use of two different and complimentary keys;
one is called the private key, and the other is called
the public key. These keys are complementary in
the sense that a message encrypted with one can
only be decrypted by the other. For example, a
message encrypted with the private key can only
be decrypted with the public key, and vice versa.
It is not computationally feasible to derive one key
from the other. the RSA algorithms of Public key
cryptography has been tested a lot, and has been
found to be secure for keys of a large enough size.
Usually, the private key is kept secret by the user,
while the public key is well-known and available to
the public, and needs to be known to any party
that needs to be able to send encrypted messages
to the user. The public key may be easily avaliable,
but the private key would be required to decrypt
the message so this method is secure. It can be
done the other way around, (the sender uses their
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own private key to encrypt the message) but the
application for that is to sign a message because
anyone would be able to decrypt the message with
the sender’s public key, so that is not secure, but
proves the identity of the sender.
Key size is a very important issue: 128 bits used
to be considered secure, but now the current key
size that is considered ’unbreakable’ is a 1024-bit
key [2].
2.4 Data Encryption Standard
(DES)
DES is one of the most commonly used and most
analysed encryption standards in existance. Its un-
derlying algorithm is the Data Encryption Algo-
rithm (DEA). It is a block cipher with a block size
of 64 bits and has a key length of 56 bits.
2.4.1 Background and Security Issues
The main vulnerability of DES has proven to be
the key length, which had been a cause for concern
from the beginning. All of the successful attempts
at cracking DES had been through the use of brute
force attacks, which becomes easier and easier to
succeed with as computers become more powerful
and less expensive. It has been shown that a ma-
chine can theoretically be constructed that would
be able to crack DES in around three-and-a-half
hours and would cost a relatively modest one mil-
lion US dollars to construct [3].
Regardless of these security issues around its key
length, today DES is the most widely used encryp-
tion scheme [2]. It is widely used in the financial
industry to protect sensitive online applications [3].
Although the short DES key length presents a
major vulnerability, the algorithm itself has proven
to be very secure: because DES is such a widely
deployed standard, it has become the most-studied
encryption algorithm in existence and, despite nu-
merous attempts using numerous approaches, no
one has so far publicly acknowledged having dis-
covered a fatal weakness in the algorithm [2].
2.5 Triple DES (3DES)
Triple DES (3DES) was first standardized for use
in financial applications in ANSI standard X9.17 in
1985, and was incorporated as part of DES in 1999
with the publication of FIPS PUB 46-3 [1] [2].
The only difference between DES and 3DES is
that 3DES uses three keys and performs three exe-
cutions of the DES algorithm.
The 3DES encryption process is as follows:
C = EK3 [DK2 [EK1 [P ]]]
where
C = ciphertext
P = plaintext
EK [X] = encryption of X using key K
DK [Y ] = decryption of Y using key K
The decryption process is the same as above, but
with the three keys used in reverse:
P = DK1 [EK2 [DK3 [C]]]
As can be seen from the above, 3DES uses
an Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (EDE) process. The
only significance of the decryption in the middle
is that it makes 3DES fully backwards-compatible
with single DES, which is equivalent to a 3DES en-
cryption with all three keys being the same:
C = EK1 [DK1 [EK1 [P ]]] = EK1 [P ]
If three different keys are used, then the effec-
tive key length is 168 bits. This is a substantial
improvement over the 56-bit key length used by
DES and makes the successful use of brute force
attacks almost impossible. Furthermore, because
3DES uses the same underlying algorithm as DES
(DEA), it can claim the same resistence to crypt-
analysis based on the algorithm as DEA [2].
2.6 Message Authentication
Encryption provides protection against passive at-
tacks such as the release of message contents. On
the other hand, message authentication provides
protection against active attacks such as the falsifi-
cation of data and transactions, whereas encryption
provides protection against passive attacks such as
the release of message contents.
A message is said to be authentic if it is gen-
uine and came from its alleged source [2]. Message
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authentication is a procedure that allows communi-
cating entities to verify that received messages are
authentic.
The two most important things to verify are that
the message has not been altered or modified after
being sent, and that the message is in fact from an
authentic source. It may also be necessary to verify
the timeliness (i.e. that it has not been artificially
delayed or replayed) and/or sequence of the mes-
sage relative to other messages recieved from the
source in question [2].
2.6.1 Message Authentication Codes
(MACs)
MACs are a commonly used technique for message
authentication in which a small block of data (the
message authenication code) is appended to the
message before it is sent. The MAC is calculated
as a function of the message M and a secret key
K which is shared between the two communicating
parties A and B. The idea is that every possible
message has a unique MAC, and that it be impos-
sible to generate M from its MAC algorithmically
(called the “one-way” property).
The process is as follows: A generates the MAC
for a messageM and appends it to the message and
sends it over the network. Upon receipt, B removes
the MAC from the message, and performs its own
calculation of the MAC based on the contents ofM
and K. It then compares its version of the MAC
to the one received with the message. If they are
identical, the message is authentic, and B can be
certain of the following facts:
1. The message has not been altered.
2. A was the sender of the message.
3. The message sequence number is correct (if the
message did in fact contain a sequence num-
ber).
B can be certain of point 1 because if an attacker
had modified the message, she would have had to
modify the MAC as well, which would have had
to be computed from the newly modified message.
This would only have been possible if the attacker
had known the secret key.
Point 2 is a certainty because it is assumed that
only A knows the secret key, and as such is the only
entity able to generate the correct MAC for M .
Point 3 is certain for the same reason as point 1.
B can be certain that the messages have not been
reordered or lost [2].
Any number of algorithms could be used to gen-
erate this MAC, but DES is the one recommended
by FIPS PUB 113. An encrypted version of the
message is generated using DES, but only the first
N bytes are used as the MAC.
LibX9 uses MACs generated with the DES algo-
rithm for message authentication, as recommended
in X9.9 [5] (see §2.15).
2.7 Hash functions and Digital Sig-
natures
Hash functions take as a parameter a variable
length of bits, and output a fixed size value called a
hash code. The hash code can’t be used to work out
the actual message itself. These are used as follows:
a message is written, and when it is ready to be sent
its hash value is taken. this is appended to the mes-
sage and the resulting message is encrypted. Now
if the message is changed in transit, the hash code
will almost certainly be invalid. Algorithms that
are commonly used for this, are MD5 and SHA-1.
Sometimes a hash algorithm is used as a digital sig-
nature. if confidentiality isn’t an issue, they can be
used like this: a person writes a message, hashes it
and encrypts the hash with his private key. This
shows everyone that he wrote it, and that the mes-
sage is unchanged.
Unlike traditional paper signatures, digital sig-
natures authenticate both the user and the docu-
ment. Each digital signature is unique to the doc-
ument being signed, and associates the user with
that document. For this reason, digital signatures
are more secure than paper signatures.
2.8 Digital Certificates
Because anyone can generate key pairs, there are
ways to compromise the security of public key cryp-
tography. For example, a malicious party could set
up an impostor server and then provide their pub-
lic key to the user. Digital certificates prevent this
kind of fraud by providing a secure, authenticated
way of distributing public and private keys. Dig-
ital certificates are also used to authenticate the
parties invlovled in the transaction so that every-
4
one can be confident that they know who they are
communicating with.
A digital certificate contains its owner’s identitiy,
public key and other information that is needed
to authenticate the certificate. The certificate it-
self is encrypted with a certificate authority’s (CA)
private key. Third parties such as VeriSign, RSA
Security and Thawte act as CAs, providing a “re-
spected, independent resource to issue keys and cer-
tificates to their holders.” [9]
Digital certificates can be used for authentica-
tion. If entities A and B establish a connection,
sometimes only one-way authentication is required,
and sometimes two-way (or even 3-way) authenti-
cation is required. This is a description of these
methods:
1-way authentication: A authenticates itself to
B by sending B its certificate and proving that
it has the secret key matching the public key
on the certificate. This is useful for applica-
tions where the client has nothing to lose if
someone else masquerades as the server and
gets some of his confidential information. This
is not the case in this application. If A is pre-
tending to be someone else and sending that
person’s certificate, it will be easy enough to
find out: when B sends any encrypted data to
A (encrypted with A’s public key) A won’t be
able to decrypt it.
2-way authentication: where the client AND
the server authenticate themselves to each
other by sending each other their certificates
and proving their identities by means of the
secret keys as described above. This is suffi-
cient for the purposes of our application.
2.9 SIM cards
In a secure mobile syste, a Subscriber Identity Mod-
ule (SIM) card is often used to authenticate the
user of the mobile device (the client). These cards
are used to store the client’s authentication infor-
mation, such as her private key that is used for
encryption and for digital signature generation. In
order to authenticate the user to be able to use the
device, the a PIN (Personal Identification Num-
ber), will be prompted for, which will then be used
to access their private key.
SIM cards are tamper-proof. The data stored on
a SIM card is encrypted and can only be unlocked
with a PIN. For this reason, the use of SIM cards
for user authentication in an m-commerce system
is very reliable and secure.
2.10 Wireless Transport Layer Secu-
rity (WTLS)
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) is a
communications security protocol that is similar
to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), but has been made
simpler and more lightweight in order to be more
suitable for the wireless environment with its lower
data rates, higher latency and weaker computa-
tional power.
WTLS, like SSL, makes use of public key encryp-
tion and hash codes to ensure secure wireless data
transmission. It is becoming the standard for pro-
viding authentication, data integrity, and privacy
to wireless applications.
2.11 Secure Electronic Transaction
(SET)
SET is an open security specification which was
designed with the primary goal of enabling secure
credit card transactions on the Internet. It was cre-
ated in response to a call for security standards by
MasterCard and Visa in 1996. Some of the compa-
nies that were involved in the development of the
initial specification are IBM, Microsoft, Netscape,
RSA, Terisa, and Verisign. The concept has since
been through numerous tests, and the first wave of
SET-compliant products started appearing in 1998
[2].
SET is not a payment system, and can better be
described as a set of security protocols and formats
that facilitates the use of existing credit card pay-
ment systems on an open, public network, such as
the Internet, in a secure fasion [2].
The requirements that SET fulfills are as follows:
Confidentiality of payment and ordering infor-
mation: It is necessary to assure customers
that this information is secure and only acces-
sible by the intended recipient.
Integrity of all transmitted data: It is neces-
sary to ensure that no undetected changes in
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the content of transmitted messages occur dur-
ing transmission. SET uses digital signatures
(similar to MACs) to this end.
Authentication of cardholder: SET uses digi-
tal signatures and digital certificates for this
purpose.
Authentication of merchant: Cardholders
need to be albe to identify merchants with
whom they can conduct secure transactions.
SET uses digital signatures and certificates to
this end.
Best security practices and system design tech-
niques: SET is a well-tested specificaton based
on highly secure cryptographic algorithms and
protocols.
Independent of transport security mechanisms:
SET can securely operate over TCP/IP, but,
at the same time, does not interfere with the
use of other security mechanisms such as IPSec
and SSL/TLS.
Interoperability among software and network
providers: The SET protocols and formats are
independent of the underlying hardware plat-
form, operating system, and Web software [2].
The customer’s payment and order information
get transmitted from the customer’s device (e.g.
computer) to the merchant, which then connects to
the third party responsible for processing mechant
payment messages. Thus, at some point during
the transaction, the merchant is in posession of the
customer’s payment (credit card) information. It
would not be acceptable for the merchant to be able
to read this information. Additionally, the third
party payment processing entity should not be able
to read the the customer’s order information. This
introduces a challenging problem which is solved in
SET by a combination of a hashing and encryption
called a dual signature. A detailed explanation of
how dual signatures work is beyond the scope of
this report. However, the bottom line is that, with
the use of dual signatures, the order and payment
information can be sent from the customer to the
merchant to the payment processor, without the
merchant being able to read the payment informa-
tion or the payment processor being able to read
the order information. Dual signatures also ensure
that it is impossible to disassociate the order and
payment information once they have been “signed”
and associated with each other [2].
This example serves to illustrate one of the many
complexities imposed by the architecture of exist-
ing e-commerce systems, of which SET is one of the
most prominent.
2.12 ANSI X9-Series of Standards
The X9 Committee is accredited by ANSI and de-
velops technical standards for the financial services
industry. Its mission is to “develop, establish, pub-
lish, maintain, and promote standards for the Fi-
nancial Services Industry in order to facilitate de-
livery of financial products and services” [8]. Some
of its most noteworthy strategic objectives are to:
• Provide a common source for all standards af-
fecting the Finance Services Industry.
• Promote use of Financial Services Industry
standards.
• Participate and promote the development of
international standards [8].
Its inter-industry voting membership includes
over 300 organizations representing investment
bankers, banks, software and equipment manufac-
turers, printers, credit unions, depositories, govern-
ment regulators, associations, consultants, among
others. Its standards are reviewed by ANSI before
publication and its operations are audited by ANSI
every five years.
This project implements a number of these X9
standards in libx9, including:
X9.26-1990 (Financial Institution Sign-On Au-
thentication for Wholesale Financial Transac-
tions)
X9.9-1986 (Financial Institution Message Au-
thentication (Wholesale)
X9.23-1988 (Financial Institution Encryption of
Wholesale Financial Messages)
2.13 X9.23 (Encryption)
2.13.1 Scope
X9.23 (Financial Institution Encryption of Whole-
sale Financial Messages) specifies a method for the
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encryption of wholesale financial messages (such as
wire transfers), or encryption elements within mes-
sages, in order to provide confidentiality. The en-
cryption algorithm specified by X9.23 is DES. How-
ever, in light of single DES’s vulnerability to brute
force key guessing attacks, Semcom uses 3DES for
its implementation of X9.23 instead.
2.14 X9.26 (Sign-on Authentication)
X9.26 specifies peer entity sign-on authentication.
In the following paragraphs, the requestor is the
entity requesting sign-on authentication, while the
grantor is the entity who grants or denies authen-
tication. The protocol specified by X9.26 uses the
TVP as a “challenge” from the grantor to the re-
questor, who is then required to reply with a “re-
sponse” which contains the TVP encrypted with
the shared secret key using 3DES in ECB mode.
If the grantor decrypts this TVP and the result
matches the generated TVP, sign-on authentication
is successful.
2.15 X9.9 (Message Authentication)
X9.9 specifies a method to authenticate financial
messages including funds transfers (e.g. wire trans-
fers), letters of credit, security transfers, loan agree-
ments, and foreign exchange contracts. The au-
thentication algorithm specified by X9.9 is based
on the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA), which
is used by 3DES, in ECB mode.
The main protection provided by X9.9 is that
against accidental or deliberate alteration or dupli-
cation of messages between the originator and the
recipient. Furthermore, the proper use of X9.9 im-
plicitly verifies the identity of the originator.
Protection against message duplication is pro-
vided by the inclusion of the date of generation and
a unique message identifier (MID). In the case of
libx9, the MID is a sequence number, which is how
it provides protection against duplication.
The message originator generates a Message Au-
thenticaton Code (MAC) by applying the authen-
tication algorithm to the message with a secret key
shared between originator and recipient as input.
The MAC is to be included in the message be-
fore being sent to the recipient. The recipient then
computes its own version of the MAC and compares
it to the attached MAC. The equality of the com-
puted MAC to the attached MAC will constitute
authentication of the message.
Upon receipt of the message, the recipient re-
moves the MAC and computes its own version over
the rest of the message. If the received MAC is
identical to the newly computed version, authenti-
cation is successful.
Authentication may fail due to a number of rea-
sons such as message structure rule violations (e.g.
nested field delimiters or missing fields), or an at-
tached MAC that does not match the computed
MAC.
3 Method/Approach
3.1 Architecture
Figure 1: System Architecture
The connection between the mobile device and
the transaction server is a wireless or cellular con-
nection, so it may use cellular protocols such as
GSM or UMTS, or computer communication pro-
tocols such as TCP/IP over WI-FI (IEEE 802.11).
This connection shall henceforth be referred to as
“link A”.
The connection between the Transaction Server
and the bank application is over an untrusted
TCP/IP computer network such as the Internet.
This connection shall henceforth be referred to as
“link B”.
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The system we implemented consists of four main
parts (see figure 1):
The Mobile Application: We implemented this
on a PC using OpenSSL, because we didn’t
have access to a mobile device or a mobile de-
vice emulator. this is link A
Transaction Server: The transaction server
(TS) resides on the MSP’s premises. It will
accept requests from the mobile device. It
will be responsible for the authentication of
the customer, the retrieval of the customer’s
credit details from the Virtual Wallet Server,
and the transferral of currency to the value of
the transaction amount into the merchant’s
bank account over link B.
Virtual Wallet Server: The virtual wallet
server’s principal responsibility is to respond
to the transaction server’s requests for cus-
tomer credit information by retrieving this
information from the virtual wallet database
to which it is connected and sending this
information back to the transaction server.
Bank/Backend Server: This is the application
running on the merchant’s bank’s server. It
processes electronic funds transfer messages re-
ceived from the Transaction Server.
3.2 General Operation
When the customer is ready to make her purchase,
she enters the transaction amount and the mer-
chant’s bank’s identifier and account number into
the handheld application which sends this informa-
tion to the transaction server over a TLS (Trans-
port Layer Security) connection. The TLS connec-
tion is established using authentication data (e.g.
an encryption key, digital certificates, etc.) stored
on the smart or SIM card which would typically be
inside the handheld device.
Upon receipt of this information, the transaction
server sends a request in the form of a token repre-
senting the identity of the customer to the virtual
wallet server. The identification token is derived
from the device ID of the handheld device used by
the customer. Currently this token is in the form
of a username.
The virtual wallet server looks up the customer’s
username in the virtual wallet database to which
it is connected, and if such a virtual wallet ex-
ists, sends back the customer’s credit balance. If
the customer has sufficient credit, the transaction
server transfers the money into the merchant’s bank
account by connecting to the bank server, which
returns an indication of success to the transaction
server. This completes the transaction.
3.3 Security
As explained by the problem definition, the security
requirements of connection B are:
1. confidentiality
2. peer entity authentication
3. message (data) authentication
4. integrity
It is assumed that the virtual wallet server is lo-
cated on the service provider’s premises along with
the transaction server, which means that the se-
curity of the connection between them is not as
critical as the others.
3.3.1 Connection A
Connection A was implemented using OpenSSL.
Requirement 1, confidentiality, is satisfied by the
session key that is established in an OpenSSL link.
Requirement 2, peer entity authentication, is sat-
isfied by the use of X.509 digital cetificates.
Requirement 3 and 4 are satisfied by hashing
algorithms: a hash is used to ensure message in-
tegrity, and a hash is signed with the private key of
the signer, which can be verified with that person’s
public key.
3.3.2 Connection B
Requirement 1 (confidentiality) is addressed by en-
cryption. Encryption is provided by the X9.23
standard (§2.13). The X9.23 standard specifies the
means for using encryption to “scramble” all com-
munications so that unauthorized parties are un-
able to interpret them. Only those parties who
know the secret key are able to decipher the trans-
missions.
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Requirement 2, peer entity authentication, is
provided by X9.26 (§2.14), which provides sign-on
authentication. Through sign-on authentication,
we can determine whether or not the party request-
ing a connection is who they claim to be.
Requirement 3 and 4 are in the domain of mes-
sage authentication (§2.6), which is provided by
the X9.9 standard (§2.15) in this implementation.
Through the use of X9.9 we can detect when
received messages have been modified and also
whether or not the received message is from an au-
thorized source.
4 Results
Semcom satisfies the four fundamental require-
ments of a secure system:
Integrity of messages is provided by X9.9 (mes-
sage authentication). The slightest modifica-
tion of the message will be detected.
Confidentiality is provided by X9.23 (encryp-
tion). Messages can only be read by a party if
it posesses the secret key.
Authentication: Peer entity authentication is
implemented by X9.26, while message authen-
tication is implemented by X9.9.
The code which satisfies these requirements was
implemented on top of highly secure cryptographic
algorithms (3DES), protocols (X9), and implemen-
tations (OpenSSL/libcrypto). Testing proved that
these tools were used correctly and that the pro-
tocols and algorithms that had to be implemented
produced the correct results.
In addition, the system satisfies most of SET’s
requirements:
Confidentiality of payment and ordering infor-
mation: As was explained above, confidential-
ity is provided by encryption. Payment infor-
mation is kept on the MSP’s servers, and thus
does not get transmitted over the network.
Only the merchant’s bank account number and
the transaction amount is sent over the net-
work. However, these are protected by encryp-
tion. Order information does not get trans-
mitted over the network either, because the
customer only sends the transaction amount
to the MSP, which is protected by the secu-
rity protocols and mechanisms implemented
on link A.
Integrity of all transmitted data: The provision
of message integrity was discussed above.
Authentication of cardholder: If a customer
does not have a pre-arranged credit account
with her MSP, the transaction would never be
able to be initiated.
Authentication of merchant: As the merchant
is not involved in the transaction, there is no
need to verify this. If the merchant does not
have an account at one of the banks supported
by the system, then the transaction would nat-
urally never be initiated. If this does happen
for some reason, the bank server would simply
reject the request, and the transaction would
fail.
Best security practices and system design tech-
niques: As mentioned above, Semcom makes
use of well-known and proven algorithms and
standards, the implementation of which has
been tested and shown to be correct.
Protocol independent of transport security
mechanisms: Because the X9 standards
operate at the application layer, they do not
interfere with anything at or lower than the
network layer. Thus, Semcom is fully capable
of co-existing with security mechanisms such
as SSL/TLS or IPSec.
Semcom satisfies six out of the seven the re-
quirements of SET, one of the most prominent e-
commerce security standards. Not only does it sat-
isfy them, but it even obsoletes some of them due
to the simplicity of its architecture. This simplicity
is a result of the fact that the merchant’s involve-
ment in the transaction is totally removed and that
the MSP is trusted by the customer.
With Semcom’s architecture, the customer au-
thorizes the transaction through her mobile service
provider (MSP), cutting out the middleman (the
merchant). The customer is effectively doing the
banking portion of the transaction herself, which is
a much simpler solution than that provided by stan-
dards like SET. This is achieved by having the MSP
handle the funds transfer on behalf of the customer.
9
This would require the MSP to have a prior ar-
rangement with the merchant’s bank. This greatly
simplifies the security infrastructure needed to ful-
fill the system’s security requirements, because it is
assumed that the customer trusts her MSP. Com-
plex mechanisms such as SET’s dual signature are
not necessary with such a simple architecture.
Link A is an end-to-end secure connection. The
SSL record protocol ensures that data is encrypted,
as each encrypted SSL record is fragmented and
sent over TCP.
Link B is certainly an end-to-end secure connec-
tion. Packets sent over link B are encrypted at
all times until they reach their destination. X9.23
specifies application-layer encryption, which means
that IP routing headers are not encrypted. This
allows the encrypted packet to be routed accross
large networks without the need to be decrypted at
intermediate nodes in order to get routing informa-
tion. Thus, given that link A was known to be end-
to-end secure, and considering that the transaction
server is under the control of the trusted MSP, the
system could be declared end-to-end secure.
Semcom’s simplicity makes it easier and cheaper
to implement and maintain, and also places no bur-
den on the merchant, who has no involvement in
the transaction besides verifying that the transac-
tion amount has been deposited into his account.
Not only does Semcom’s architecture fulfill the
requirements of SET, but it also adds end-to-end
security.
5 Conclusion
Semcom has been shown to be a secure m-
commerce system which satisfies four of the fun-
damental requirements of secure computer systems
as well as six out of the seven requirements of
SET. However, Semcom’s architecture is signifi-
cantly simpler than that of SET due to the elimi-
nation of the merchant’s involvement in the trans-
action, and the introduction of the MSP which is
trusted by the customer. This makes a tremendous
difference in the complexity of the required hard-
ware and software infrastructure.
Semcom’s simplicity makes it easier and cheaper
to implement and maintain, and also places no bur-
den on the merchant, who has no involvement in
the transaction besides verifying that the transac-
tion amount has been deposited into his account.
Perhaps the most important advantage of Sem-
com is that it provides end-to-end security.
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